The U.S. foreign policy toward the State Peace and Development Council of Myanmar is closely watched by both the Myanmarese (Burmese) people and the international community, in case any positive development might emerge.
Despite the ongoing high-level engagement, President Barack Obama, on May 14, extended the national emergency in executive order beyond the expiration date of May 20, 2010.
In a message sent to the U.S. Congress, Obama said, ``These actions and policies are hostile to U.S. interests and pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.''
The initial declaration was a consequence of actions and policies of the Myanmarese junta, including repression of the democratic opposition.
The order, first declared on May 20, 1997, was modified and extended with additional steps in executive order 13310 on July 28, 2003, executive order 13448 on October 18, 2007, and executive order 13464 on April 30, 2008.
The sanctions prohibit American firms from investing in Myanmar (Burma) and bans Myanmar's exports to the United States. It also targets individuals associated with the military junta.
A two-day visit to Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon (Rangoon) from May 9 to 10 by Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was an indication of the Obama administration's continued efforts to create a political environment where the military rulers and the opposition groups can participate.
Not only the Myanmarese people themselves are frustrated with the continued political imbroglio, but we could also sense the disappointment of the U.S. government.
At the end of his two-day visit to the country, Campbell said, ``The key objective of my trip to Burma was to underscore the purposes and principles of our engagement, and to lay out the reasons for our profound disappointment in what we have witnessed to date.''
Given the intransigent nature of the junta, it is highly unlikely that the military leaders will be deterred by words of disappointment and pressure. The U.S. sanctions are no incentive for the generals to swap the absolute power and privileges they currently enjoy.
The U.S. sanctions are ineffective largely because of the investments and economic cooperation from countries such as China, India, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
It is vital to build a coordinated international approach. It is recommended that the Obama administration considers the model of the North Korean six-party talks. The six-party negotiation should involve the United States, the European Union, ASEAN, China, India, and Myanmar.
The White House is not likely to succeed in Myanmar by acting alone. The military junta will heed pressure: (1) if the U.S. unilaterally decides to use military force if negotiations fail; (2) if the U.S. can convince the U.N. Security Council members to intervene by passing a binding resolution under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter; (3) if the Myanmarese military generals can be tried at the International Criminal Court. However, the chances of fulfilling all these options are very slim, at least in the foreseeable future.
Though any concrete positive outcome is yet to be seen, the U.S. engagement policy is a welcoming approach. The policy is largely supported by the peoples of Myanmar ― both the military junta and the democratic opposition representing different ethnic nationalities.
Faced with criticisms and pressures for years, the military junta is planning to hold the upcoming general election in an attempt to garner legitimacy, if not endorsement, from the international community.
With a lesson learned in the 1990 general election, the military is prepared not to have history repeats itself. To ensure that its power remains intact, the junta drafted a constitution which has reserved 25 percent of parliament seats for the military.
The junta passed election laws which effectively bar Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, and therefore, resulted in the dissolution of a number of political parties, including the National League for Democracy and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, which respectively won the first and second largest seats in the 1990 general election.
As these democratic parties will no longer contest in the upcoming election, the military junta is equally pleased and nervous as well. The absence of these parties means that the election is a win-win plan for the military.
If the United States, together with its international partners such as the European Union, decides not to recognize the election result if held under the existing restrictive laws, the military will lack the international legitimacy it yearns for.
It is encouraging that the U.S. engagement is focused on the diverse ethnic nationalities, and not only the junta. It must be noted that the decades-old Myanmar's problems are ethno-political in nature, and therefore, without addressing ethnic minority issues, the situation will not be solved.
Nehginpao Kipgen is a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Myanmar (1947-2004) and general secretary of the U.S.-based Kuki International Forum (www.kukiforum.com). He has written numerous analytical articles on the politics of Myanmar and Asia that have been widely published in five continents (Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe, and North America). He can be reached at nehginpao@yahoo.com.
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